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Conventional wisdom focuses on technological superiority as the key source of American
dominance on the battlefield. Even though the United States is clearly still struggling at the
strategic level in its fight against terrorists and insurgents, it is supremely confident in its
ability to defeat these groups in combat at the tactical level, due in no small part to
technological advantages such as total air superiority, remote surveillance, command-and-
control systems, precision munitions, and night-vision capabilities. Observers are largely
focused on these technologies – such as drones and night-vision goggles – and their
potential diffusion to violent non-state actors. What has been overlooked in the debate over
the combat potential of violent extremists is the diffusion of something much more
rudimentary and potentially more lethal: basic infantry skills. These include coordinated small-
team tactical maneuvers supported by elementary marksmanship. The diffusion of such
tactics seems to be underway, and it may generate serious concerns for U.S. security policy in
the future if ignored.
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The historian David Edgerton authored a book entitled The Shock of the Old  in which he argues
that our society’s collective obsession with rapidly changing technology often blinds us to the
older tools and techniques that actually drive most of what we observe around us. We believe
this logic can be applied here. The diffusion of 100-year old combat techniques, coupled with
readily available technology, may create serious threats that are not currently being
considered.
To be clear, we do not argue that the diffusion of such skills will allow extremist non-state
groups to defeat U.S. forces in a stand-up fight. America’s enemies have largely (and wisely)
avoided sustained combat operations designed to militarily defeat U.S. forces, but have rather
developed effective asymmetric offsets – such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) –
designed to sap political will. This strategy will not change. We do, however, argue that the
marginal improvement of tactical prowess in violent non-state groups may lead to outcomes
that have strategic implications for global U.S. counter-terrorist and counter-insurgent
operations in two other ways. First, it will make it more likely that violent non-state groups will
be able to more frequently impose casualties on and overmatch small, isolated U.S. elements,
as occurred in the tragic Niger ambush of October 2017. Given the current American practice
of deploying small units across remote regions of the world, coupled with the extreme political
sensitivity surrounding the death and capture of U.S. servicemembers, such outcomes could
be a game-changer. Second, the large conventional partner forces the United States has spent
billions creating in Iraq and Afghanistan often struggle to simply tread water on the battlefield
when operating independently. Any increased combat capacity of extremist groups could lead
to the type of collapse the world witnessed with the meteoric rise of the ISIL caliphate in 2014.
In sum, improved tactical prowess may open the door for strategic success for these groups,
despite their continued inability to defeat U.S. forces in conventional battle.
Stephen Biddle explains that the modern tactics still practiced by the world’s most advanced
militaries were developed by the German army in the closing year of World War I. After four
years of brutal trench warfare, all participants were struggling to overcome the stalemate they
had created on the Western Front. The proliferation of bolt-action rifles and machine guns,
coupled with highly effective field artillery and mortars, fundamentally changed how infantry
operated on the battlefield. A Napoleonic infantry battalion of 1000 men with muskets could
fire 2000 rounds (with poor aim) per minute to a range of about 100 yards. In comparison, a
World War I-era battalion armed with rifles and four machine guns could fire 21,000 rounds
(with precise aim) per minute to a range of 10 football fields (1000 yards). The result of this
increase of focused fire was to force armies away from the massed formations of the
Napoleonic Wars to trenches and bunkers in the face of this “storm of steel.” By distilling and
updating skirmishing tactics that stretched back to the 18th century, the Germans developed
dispersed, well-trained, small groups of soldiers who were empowered to work as teams. They
exploited cover and utilized “fire-and-maneuver,” in which one element of the team suppressed
enemy fire while the other element moved to flank the opponent’s position.
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Such tactics remain essentially unaltered a century later. On the one hand, military technology
as a whole has changed tremendously over the last 100 years (nuclear weapons, satellites,
missiles, et cetera). On the other hand, small arms are almost unchanged. The current Colt M4
carbine has more similarities to the Springfield M1903 (adopted in 1903) than differences. And
the Colt M1911 pistol (adopted in 1911) is considered by many to be a superior side-arm to
the Beretta M9 that has been issued to the U.S. Army for the last 30 years, and perhaps even
the Sig Sauer that is set to replace it. It should not come as a surprise, then, that the core
tactics that comprise modern combat have remained largely static.
It should also not come as a surprise that the U.S. military is extremely good at these basic
skills. U.S. military doctrine is thoroughly imbued with these tactics. They were acquired during
World War II and embedded into the military’s DNA over the following decades as it prepared
to defend the Fulda Gap against the Red Army. To this day, America’s military forces are
masters of the maneuver warfare operational concepts within which these tactics play a
crucial role. As a result of simply being really good at basic infantry skills, the U.S. military has
enjoyed a significant asymmetry over its enemies at the tactical level. This fact appears to be
almost entirely lost amidst the current debates over cutting-edge technologies or “the battle of
the narrative”.
Is there evidence that the bad guys are getting better at basic tactics? Yes. Consider Boko
Haram. Having only launched its military campaign in 2009, it has already mastered the use of
coordinated fire and maneuver elements at the tactical level to execute complex raids,
ambushes, assaults, and even withdrawing by echelon when on the defensive. It even staged
an amphibious assault that overran a Nigerien Army garrison  on an island in Lake Chad.
Another example is from much closer to the U.S. homeland. Utilizing tactics diffused through
U.S. military training, drug cartels such as the infamous “Zetas” and “Jalisco New Generation”
have institutionalized combat training that allows them to regularly wreak havoc on Mexican
security forces. In the wake of a recent downing of a Mexican military helicopter through the
employment of rocket-propelled grenades, the disturbing discovery was made of tactical gear
emblazoned with “CJNG – High Command Special Forces” (Cartel de Jalisco Nueva
Generacion). Further evidence comes from the Iraqi campaign to defeat ISIL. Conventional
forces struggled mightily to eject ISIL from Iraq’s territory, and only succeeded due to the
heavy use of Iraqi special operations forces and liberal American airpower. The battle of
Mosul, for example, lasted for nine months despite significant material U.S. support and a 20:1
force ratio against the ISIL defenders. Afghan conventional military forces are often defeated
by an increasingly competent Taliban. On the other side of the world, Filipino forces had to
destroy much of the town of Marawi to liberate it from jihadist insurgents during a five-month
siege last year. Furthermore, these enemies seem to be gravitating towards operations in
urban areas. These environments hinder the United States and its partners from utilizing their
high-tech advantages, resulting in a playing field that could get ever more level. Finally, given
the ease with which such groups can infiltrate poorly vetted partner forces, the U.S. military
has probably provided tactical instruction to the enemy directly and indirectly for a long time.
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As one U.S. military advisor in Afghanistan told one of us: “Sometimes a trainee just doesn’t
show up right before graduation, and then – sure enough – you are fighting him on the next
objective.”
In summary, rather than celebrating the (shockingly slow) destruction of the ISIL caliphate , the
U.S. military should realize that one of its enemies just learned a whole lot about combat: basic
infantry tactics, urban operations, and the clever blending of emerging technologies . These
lessons will spread globally, and faster than many expect.
What should be done in response? First, the United States has to recognize that the bad guys
will get better. Rather than perpetuating the comforting myth that enemy ranks are saturated
with incompetent wackos, planners and policymakers must understand that these groups have
highly motivated and – with the right training – potentially capable fighters.
Second, we need to remember that humans are more important than hardware. The welter of
debate over high technology widgets has obscured the fact that technologies are leveraged by
individuals and organizations. Biddle wrote a prescient article back in 1996 entitled “Victory
Misunderstood” about the implications of the 1991 Gulf War in which he challenged the
hypothesis that technology would be the deciding factor on 21st century battlefields. His
analysis showed that basic soldiering skills were crucial to the lopsided victory over Iraqi
forces. He argued that technology may simply “be magnifying the effects of skill differentials
on the battlefield. If so, then a given skill imbalance may be much more important today than
in the past”. We proposed a similar argument here. Therefore, the U.S. military needs to not
only be wary of the changing skill sets of the enemies of the United States but also keep a
similarly watchful eye over the maintenance of our own human capital. U.S. forces are only as
good as the men and women they select, train, and develop.
As a consequence, the U.S. military should stop being one of the best suppliers of tactical
instruction to the bad guys. Planners should be more discerning when it comes to building
partner capacity. Additional scrutiny should be placed on which partner nation military units
are being trained, what roles they will play in the fight, and how large and good they need to be.
Most of these nations do not need a Western-style conventional military, but rather a politically
reliable force dedicated to internal security and counter-terrorism. In both Iraq and
Afghanistan, large (and probably unsustainable) conventional partner forces fight poorly (when
they do fight) and, therefore, the specialized counter-terrorism and elite units U.S. mentors
have carefully crafted are consistently overused as assault troops. In the words of another
U.S. military advisor in Afghanistan, speaking of the country’s elite commando units: “Eight
percent of the troops do 80 percent of the fighting.” Rather than choosing to train large
numbers of poorly vetted partner conventional forces, the United States should probably
choose to save such training (and resources) for smaller numbers of higher quality and better
vetted forces. Such efforts will inevitably involve the diffusion of training and technology (and
the risk of a future “Zetas” blowback). Therefore, the United States needs to be more mindful
about who gets what, and for what purpose.
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Finally – and most importantly – the citizenry of the United States needs to scrutinize leaders’
policy choices more closely when the lives of military personnel are at risk. The days of
imposing America’s will on others with impunity may be over. The diffusion of skills and
technology, the increased likelihood of messy urban operations, and the waning political
appetite for military adventurism should be sobering to our leadership. If the loss of four
soldiers rattles our nation, we must think much harder about when we are willing to put our
troops in harm’s way.
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